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GLOSSARY 
 
 
Developed Countries- These are countries that possess a high income per capita and a 
very high Human Development Index. 
 
Developing Countries- These are countries with relatively low standards of living, an 
underdeveloped industrial base and a moderate to low Human Development Index. 
 
Foreign Direct Investment- An international interest in which a resident in one county 
obtains a long lasting interest in an enterprise resident in another. 
 
Ibid- Ibidem 
 
Investors- Persons or entities that provide the capital to private equity firms which are 
used to invest in various target companies. 
 
Least developed countries- According to the UN, these are countries which exhibit the 
lowest indicators of socio-economic development and with the lowest Human 
Development Index ratings of all the countries in the world. 
 
Private Equity- Refers to any type of investment in an asset in which equity is not 
freely tradeable on a public stock market. It also refers to the manner in which the 
funds have been raised, namely on the private markets as opposed to the public 
markets. 
 
Private Equity Funds- The pools of capital invested by private equity firms. They are 
generally organised as either a limited partnership or a limited liability company 
which is controlled by the private equity firm that acts as a general partner. 
 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) - This is a global international organisation which 
sets the rules for the global trading system of member states that are signatories to its 
Agreements 
 
 
 
 
         
 
Venture Capital- Describes investing in companies that have underdeveloped or 
developing products or revenue. Venture capital has a particular emphasis on 
entrepreneurial undertakings and less mature businesses. 
 
 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         
 
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 
 
 
AMT            Alternative Minimum Tax 
ARD      American Research and Development Corporation 
BEE      Black Economic Empowerment 
BIT      Bilateral Investment Treaty 
DFA      Department of Foreign Affairs 
DME            Department of Mineral and Energy 
DTI      Department of Trade and Industry 
EPZ      Export Processing Zones 
FDI      Foreign Direct Investment 
FOIA      Freedom of Information Act 
GDP      Gross Domestic Product 
HDSA          Historically Disadvantaged South Africans 
HHI              Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
IPO      Initial Public Offering 
LBO      Leveraged Buyout 
M&A           Mergers and Acquisitions 
MAI      Multilateral Agreement on Investment 
MPRDA       Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 
OECD      Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
PAYE      Pay As You Earn 
SA      South Africa 
SADC      South African Development Community 
SARS      South African Revenue Services 
SHD      Sustainable Human Development 
SME      Small to Medium Enterprises 
SMME         Small Medium and Macro Enterprises 
UBTI            Unrelated Business Taxable Income 
UK                United Kingdom 
UNCTAD     United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
UNI           Union Network International 
USA United States of America 
 
 
 
 
         
 
VAT Value Added Tax 
WTO World Trade Organisation 
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“Trust in the Lord with all your heart; and don’t lean on your own understanding. In 
all things acknowledge Him, and He shall direct your way” 
Proverbs3:5, 6 The Good News Bible 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
Private Equity has long been one of those aspects of trade that was mainly embarked 
upon by the First World. These developed countries were advantaged by sound and 
stable economies. This then, enabled them to get involved in investments that would 
further strengthen the economy which in turn, would secure the financial stability of 
the country. 
 
Private equity has now infiltrated the economies of developing countries and it is no 
longer considered to be an aspect of trade only undertaken by developed countries. 
 
Developing economies are currently also actively taking part in these types of 
transactions. 
 
Private equity investors are taking an interest in the South African economy in the 
same way that they have taken an interest in the economies of First World countries, 
as this economy is one of the leading developing economies on the African continent. 
 
This interest will then serve to place South African trade and investment on the world 
map of International Trade and Investment 
 
 
1.2 Aims of the Study 
 
This study proposes to have regard to the effect that private equity transactions has 
had on the South African economy. As tax is a concern that has to be taken into 
account when structuring private equity transactions, tax considerations will also be 
evaluated in this study. An analysis of foreign direct investment will also be included 
as well as a work towards an agreement on the issue under the auspices of the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO). The structure of private equity funds and private equity 
deals will also be considered. Private equity in the context of the South African 
mining sector will also be looked at.  
 
 
 
 
         
 
1.3 Research Methodology 
 
The research that will be undertaken for the compilation of this paper will primarily 
consist of database research, literature reviews and proposed interviews with experts 
in the field of private equity transactions. 
 
 
1.4 Overview of Chapters 
 
Chapter One 
 
Chapter one is an introductory chapter and its purpose is to give the reader a brief 
overview of the contents of this thesis. It aims to highlight the need for private equity 
and also indicates how private equity fits into the greater area of international trade. 
 
 
Chapter Two 
 
Chapter two explores the concept of private equity, looking at what it entails, private 
equity funds and fundraising and also the role of private equity in trade. A brief 
history of private equity is also discussed. The advantages and disadvantages of 
private equity will also be given as well as the reason as to why one should invest in 
private equity. Furthermore, due diligence in relation to private equity will be 
discussed. 
 
 
Chapter Three 
 
Chapter three aims at providing an analysis into private equity and tax considerations. 
The private equity tax situation in the United States of America (USA) will be 
examined and also how it contrasts with the tax situation in South Africa. The tax 
debate in the USA will also be discussed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         
 
Chapter Four 
 
Chapter four will be examining the concept of Foreign Direct Investment as a factor 
that influences private equity in an economy. The chapter will be exploring what FDI 
is, how countries can attract FDI especially developing and least developed countries, 
the interrelation between private equity and FDI, FDI and a Multilateral Agreement 
on Investment (MAI), as well as FDI in South Africa and Africa including the 
challenges faced by this developing continent. 
 
Chapter Five 
 
Chapter Five will be discussing the legal structure of private equity funds. It will also 
provide a note on private equity deal structures. 
 
Chapter Six 
 
Chapter six discusses private equity in the context of the South African mining and 
minerals sector also taking a look at corruption and its effect on the economy of 
developing countries. The OECD and the United Nation’s Conventions regarding 
corruption will also be discussed 
 
Chapter Seven 
 
Chapter seven is a concluding chapter and it will be looking at the private equity 
activities over the past year and also its effects on the South African economy.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         
 
 
CHAPTER 2: PRIVATE EQUITY 
 
2.1 Private Equity: Defined  
 
Private Equity is a broad term that commonly refers to any type of investment in an 
asset in which equity is not freely tradeable on a public stock market.1 More 
accurately, private equity refers to the manner in which the funds have been raised, 
namely on the private markets, as opposed to the public markets.2 Private equity firms 
were commonly misunderstood to invest in assets which were not in the public 
market.3 Presently, larger private equity firms invest in companies listed on public 
exchanges and take them private.4 Passive institutional investors may invest in private 
equity funds, which are then used by private equity firms for investment in target 
companies.5  
 
Categories of private equity investment include leveraged buyout, venture capital, 
growth capital, angel investing, mezzanine capital and others.6 Private funds typically 
control management of the companies in which they invest, and often bring in new 
management teams that focus on making the company more valuable.7 
 
As they are not listed on an exchange, a private equity firm owning such securities 
must find a buyer in the absence of a traditional market place such as a stock 
exchange.8 The “exit” or “selling out” is often achieved by way of an initial public 
offering (IPO), i.e. floating the company on a stock exchange, trade sale or secondary 
tertiary buyouts (i.e. sale to another private equity house).9 
 
 
 
                                                 
1< www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Private_equity> Assessed on 28/05/2007 
2 Ibid 
3 Ibid 
4 Ibid 
5 Ibid 
6 Ibid 
7 Ibid 
8 Ibid 
9 Ibid 
 
 
 
 
         
 
 
2.2 Private Equity Funds 
 
Private Equity Funds are the pools of capital invested by private equity firms.10 They 
are generally organized as either a limited partnership or limited liability company 
which is controlled by the private equity firm that acts as a general partner.11 The 
limited partnership is often called the “Fund”, and the general partners are often 
designated as the “Management Company”.12 The fund obtains capital commitments 
from certain qualified investors such as pension funds, financial institutions and 
wealthy individuals to invest a specific amount.13 These investors become passive 
limited partners in the fund partnership.14 At a time when the general partner 
identifies an appropriate investment opportunity, it is entitled to “call” the required 
equity capital at which time each limited partner funds a pro rata portion of its 
commitment.15 All investment decisions are made by the General Partner which also 
manages the fund’ investments (commonly referred to as the “portfolio”).16 Over the 
life of a fund which often extends up to ten years, the fund will typically make 
between 15 and 25 separate investments with usually no single investment exceeding 
10% of the total commitments.17 
 
General partners are typically compensated with a combination of a management fee, 
monitoring fees, as well as transaction fees.18 In addition, the general partner is 
entitled to “carried interest”, effectively a performance fee, based on the profits of the 
generated fund.19 Typically, the general partner will receive an annual management 
fee of 1% to 2% of committed capital and carried interest of 20% of profits above 
some target rate of return, which is typically 8% to 10% (called “hurdle rate”).20 
Gross private equity returns may be in excess of 20% per year, which in the case of 
leveraged buyout firms is primarily due to increasing levels of leverage in the 
                                                 
10 Ibid 
11 Ibid 
12 Ibid 
13 Ibid 
14 Ibid 
15 Ibid 
16 Ibid 
17 Ibid 
18 Ibid 
19 Ibid 
20 Ibid 
 
 
 
 
         
 
portfolio companies, and otherwise due to the high level of risk associated with early 
stage investments.21 
 
Private equity firms generally receive a return on their investment through one of 
three ways: an IPO (Initial Public Offering), a sale or merger of the company they 
control, or a recapitilisation.22 Unlisted securities may be sold directly to investors by 
the company (called a private offering) or to a private equity fund, which pools 
contributions from smaller investors to create a capital pool.23 
 
 
2.3 Private Equity Fundraising 
 
Private equity fundraising refers to the action of private equity firms seeking capital 
from investors for their funds. Typically, an investor will invest in a specific fund 
managed by the firm, becoming a limited partner in the fund, rather than an investor 
in the firm itself. As a result, an investor will only benefit from investments made by a 
firm where the investment is made from a specific fund that the investor has invested 
in. 
 
The majority of investment into private equity funds comes from institutional 
investors. The most prolific investors into private equity funds in 2006 were public 
pension funds, banks and financial institutions, which together provided 40% of all 
commitments made globally.24 Other prominent groups investing in private equity 
include corporate pension plans, insurance companies, endowments, family offices 
and foundations. 
 
Another large investor-group in private equity funds are so-called fund of funds, 
which are private equity funds that invest in other private equity funds in order to 
provide investors with a low risk product through exposure to a large number of 
vehicles of different type and regional focus.25  
                                                 
21 Ibid 
22 Ibid 
23 Ibid 
24 According to data from London –based Private equity Intelligence Ltd 
25 <www.wikipedia.org/wiki/Private_equity> Assessed on 28/05/2007 
 
 
 
 
         
 
Fund of funds accounted for 14% of global commitments made to private equity 
funds in 2006 according to Private Equity Intelligence Ltd.26 
 
As fundraising has grown over the past few years, so too has the number of investors 
in the average fund.27 In 2004 there were 26 investors in the average private equity 
fund; this figure has now grown to 42 according to Private Equity Intelligence Ltd.28 
 
It is also worth noting that the managers of private equity funds themselves will also 
invest in their own vehicles, typically providing between 1% and 5% of the overall 
capital.29 
 
Often private equity fund managers will employ the services of external fundraising 
teams known as placement agents in order to raise capital for their vehicles.30 The use 
of placement agents has grown over the past few years, with 40% of funds closed in 
2006 employing their services according to Private Equity Intelligence Ltd.31 
Placement agents will approach potential investors on behalf of the fund manager, and 
will usually take a fee of around 1% of the commitments that they are able to 
acquire.32 
 
The amount of time that a private equity firm spends raising capital varies depending 
on the level of interest among investors for the fund, which is defined by current 
market conditions and also the track record of the previous funds raised by the firm in 
question.33 Firms can spend as little as one or two months raising capital where they 
are able to reach the target that they set for their funds relatively easily, often through 
gaining commitments from existing investors in their previous funds, or where strong 
past performance leads to a strong level of investor interest.34 
 
                                                 
26 Ibid 
27 Ibid 
28 Ibid 
29 Ibid 
30 Ibid 
31 Ibid 
32 Ibid 
33 Ibid 
34 Ibid 
 
 
 
 
         
 
Other managers may find fundraising taking considerably longer, with less popular 
fund types finding the fundraising process tougher.35 It is not unheard of for funds to 
spend as long as two years seeking capital, although the majority of fund managers 
will complete fundraising within nine to fifteen months.36 
 
Once a fund has reached its fundraising target, it will have a final close.37 After this 
point it is not normally possible for a new investor to invest in the fund, unless they 
were to purchase an interest in the fund on the secondary market.38 
 
 
2.4 Size of the Industry 
 
Nearly $135bn of private equity was invested globally in 2005, up a fifth on the 
previous year due to a rise in buyouts as market confidence and trading conditions 
improved.39 Buyouts have generated a growing portion of private equity investments 
by value, and increased their share of investments from a fifth to more than two-thirds 
between 2000 and 2005.40 Private equity fund raising also surpassed prior years in 
2005 and totaled $232bn, up three-quarters on 2004.41 
 
Prior to this, after reaching a peak in 2000, private equity investments and funds 
raised fell in the next couple of years due to the slow down in the global economy and 
declines in equity markets, particularly in the technology sector.42 The fall in funds 
raised between 2001 and 2003 was also due to a large excess created by the end of 
2000 of funds raised over funds invested.43 
 
The regional breakdown of private equity activity shows that in 2005, North America 
accounted for 40% of global private equity investments (down from 68% in 2000) and 
                                                 
35 Ibid 
36 Ibid 
37 Ibid 
38 Ibid 
39 Ibid 
40 Ibid 
41 Ibid 
42 Ibid 
43 Ibid 
 
 
 
 
         
 
52% of funds raised (down from 69%).44 Between 2000 and 2005, Europe increased 
its share in investments (from 17% to 43%) and funds raised (from 17% to 38%).45 
This was largely a result o strong buyout market activity in Europe.46 Asia-Pacific 
region’s share of investments increased from 6% to 11% during this period while its 
share of funds raised remained unchanged at around 8%.47 
 
Private equity fundraising reached new record levels in 2006, with data from Private 
Equity Intelligence showing that a total of 684 funds worldwide achieved a final close 
over the course of 2006, raising an aggregate $432bn in commitments.48 
 
The biggest fund type in terms of commitments garnered was buyout, with 188 funds 
raising an aggregate of $212bn.49 So-called mega buyout funds contributed a 
significant portion of this amount, with the ten largest funds of 2006 raising $101bn 
alone-23% of the global total for 2006.50 
 
Other strong performers included real estate funds, which grew 30% from the already 
strong 2005 levels, raising an aggregate of %63bn globally.51 The only fund type to 
not perform so well was venture, which saw a drop of 10% from 2005 levels.52 
 
The majority of funds raised in 2006 were focusing on the American market, with 
62% of capital raised in 2006 focusing on the US.53 European focused funds account 
for 26% of the global total, whilst funds focusing on Asia and the rest of the world 
account for the remaining 11%.54 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
44 Ibid 
45 Ibid 
46 Ibid 
47 Ibid 
48 Ibid 
49 Ibid 
50 Ibid 
51 Ibid 
52 Ibid 
53 Ibid 
54 Ibid 
 
 
 
 
         
 
2.5 Private Equity Fund performance: Transparency 
 
In the past, the performance of private equity funds has been relatively difficult to 
track, as private equity firms are under no obligation to publicly reveal the returns that 
they have achieved from their investments.55 In the majority of cases the only groups 
wit the knowledge of fund performance were the investors in the fund, and the firms 
themselves, making comparisons between the various different firms and the 
establishment of market benchmarks to be a difficult challenge.56 
 
With the introduction of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in the United States 
and other countries such as the UK in the early 21st century, has led to new 
performance data for the industry becoming more readily available.57 Following the 
introduction of the FOIA legislation, London-based research and consultancy firm 
Private Equity Intelligence used the FOIA in order to request data on private equity 
fund performance from bodies such as pension funds, establishing an online 
searchable database from FOIA requests and also in a large number of instances, data 
from fund managers themselves.58 
 
It is also possible to view private equity fund performance data directly on the 
websites of certain investors.59 
 
The performance of the private equity industry over the past few years differs 
between funds of different types.60 Buyout and real estate funds have both performed 
strongly in the past few years in comparison with other asset classes such as public 
equities.61 In contrast other fund types such as venture have not shown such a strong 
overall performance.62 
 
                                                 
55 Ibid 
56 Ibid 
57 Ibid 
58 Ibid 
59 Ibid 
60 Ibid 
61 Ibid 
62 Ibid 
 
 
 
 
         
 
Manager selection in the private equity industry is definitely a vital factor for any 
investor seeking exposure to the market, with the performance of the top and bottom 
quartile managers varying dramatically, especially so in the high risk venture capital 
world , and less so with real estate funds.63 
 
 
2.6 History of Private Equity 
 
South African companies have long invested in unlisted businesses.64 The success in 
terms of growth achieved by private equity funds in the US and, to a lesser extent in 
Europe, has resulted in the development of professional private equity firms in other 
parts of the world, including South Africa.65 
 
In SA, the four major commercial banks and their predecessors pioneered leveraged 
buy-outs. This was largely driven by disinvestments from SA in the early 1980’s.66 
These buyouts, encouraged by the international success of private equity, formed the 
foundation for our private equity market today.67 
 
Organised and professionally managed investments in the private equity market can 
be traced back to 1946 in the US when the American Research and Development 
Corporation (ARD) was formed to facilitate new business formation and 
development.68 ARD’s stock persistently traded at a discount to its net asset value, 
and it had difficulty raising capital on the stock market.69 This was a negative view of 
private equity as an asset class.70 
 
During the 1950’s and 1960’s the US Congress introduced legislation to promote the 
development of small business, with moderate success.71 An increase in the market 
for IPO’s in 1968-69 resulted in significant profitable realizations of venture capital 
                                                 
63 Ibid 
64 KPMG an SAVCA Private Equity and Venture Capital Survey-2003 
65 Ibid 
66 Ibid 
67 Ibid 
68 Ibid 
69 Ibid 
70 Ibid 
71 Ibid 
 
 
 
 
         
 
investments made in the 1960’s.72 During the 1970’s, many of these venture capital 
partnerships began leveraging buyouts of divisions of large conglomerates.73 
 
During the late 1970’s, regulatory and tax changes allowed US pension funds to 
invest in private equity for the first time.74 This, together with the success of new 
leveraged buyout (LBO) firms, resulted in a boom in fund raising.75 In 1987, 
Kohlberg Kravis and Roberts raised a record US$5.6bn LBO fund, which was more 
than twice the total commitment to all other venture capital firms in that year.76 
 
The 1980’s and 1990’s therefore saw explosive growth in US private equity 
commitments.77 In 2000, private equity and venture capital investments in North 
America increased to a record with a total of $12bn funds invested.78 Expansion and 
early stage investments comprising 60% of this reflecting the strong growth in these 
subclasses of private equity.79  
 
As Europe emerged from the recession in the early 1990’s, it too became a fertile 
environment for private equity.80 In 1997, a number of private equity firms raised 
funds of more than $1bn for the first time.81 At the end of 2002, the total of European 
private equity investment portfolios at cost was estimated at $116.8bn.82  
 
The global market is dominated by North America (specifically the US) and Western 
Europe.83 Seventy percent of global funds raised from 1998 to 2002 have in fact been 
raised in North America.84 Western Europe and Asia Pacific are a distant second and 
                                                 
72 Ibid 
73 Ibid 
74 Ibid 
75 Ibid 
76 Ibid 
77 Ibid 
78 Ibid 
79 Ibid 
80 Ibid 
81 Ibid 
82 Ibid 
83 Ibid 
84 Ibid 
 
 
 
 
         
 
third with 20% and 7% respectively.85 The Middle East, Africa, Central and Southern 
America and Eastern Europe only contributed the remaining three percent.86 
 
In SA, the private equity industry was only formalized with the constituting of the 
South African Venture Capital and Private Equity Association in 1999.87 The industry 
in SA is relatively sophisticated by emerging markets’ standards and its participants 
are active in early stage investments through to large LBO’s.88 
 
 
2.7 Advantages and Disadvantages of Private Equity89 
 
The advantages include: 
Shorter chain of ownership, with partners taking an active role in the running of the 
company90; 
Longer investment horizons91; 
Fewer reporting requirements92; 
Ability to provide incentives for managers93; 
There is a greater ability to create jobs because it is better at creating successful 
companies with a long-term future94. 
 
The disadvantages include: 
Conflicts of interest, because private equity partners are involved in the running of the 
company and may have different priorities from other investors in the private equity 
fund95; 
                                                 
85 Ibid 
86 Ibid 
87 Ibid 
88 Ibid 
89 House of Commons Treasury Committee-Private Equity, Tenth Report of Session 2006-07, Volume 
1 pg 11. <www.publications.parliament.uk/pa> Assessed on 19/10/2007 
90 Ibid 
91 See the House of Commons Treasury Committee-Private Equity, Tenth Report of Session 2006-07, 
Volume 1 paragraph 21. 
92  House of Commons Treasury Committee-Private Equity, Tenth Report of Session 2006-07, Volume 
1 pg 11. <www.publications.parliament.uk/pa> Assessed on 19/10/2007 
93 Ibid 
94 Ibid 
95 Ibid 
 
 
 
 
         
 
Shorter investment horizons, because the aim is usually to sell the company after a 
few years rather than focusing on long term growth96; 
Lack of transparency making them less accountable to the public and their 
workforces97; 
Greater leverage making companies more vulnerable to economic downturns and with 
the potential to pose risks to lenders and the financial system98; 
Risk of job destruction through seeking to extract extra value99; 
Risk to pensions through the selling of assets and loading companies with debt100. 
 
 
2.8 Why Invest in Private Equity?101 
 
The fundamental rationale for investing in private equity is to improve the risk and 
reward characteristics of an investment portfolio102. Investing in private equity offers 
the investor the opportunity to generate higher absolute returns whilst improving 
portfolio diversification103.  
 
There are various features that investors may find attractive when deciding to invest 
in private equity funds. These include: 
a) Long-term historical out-performance104- 
The long term returns of private equity represent a premium to the performance of 
public equities. This has been the case in the US for over 20 years and also in 
Europe, following an increase in the number of private equity funds, for over ten 
years105. 
 
 
                                                 
96 Ibid 
97 Ibid 
98 Ibid 
99 Ibid 
100 Ibid 
101 Bance, A. “Why and How to Invest in Private Equity” An EVCA Investor Relations Committee 
Paper <www.evca.com> Assessed on 19/10/2007 
102 Ibid, pg 5 
103 Ibid 
104 Ibid 
105 Ibid 
 
 
 
 
         
 
b) True stock picking in a low inflation, low growth environment106- 
A low inflation environment creates a focus on growth stocks as a means of out-
performance107. One of the core skills of successful private equity managers is to 
pick companies with growth potential and to actively create the conditions for 
growth in those companies108. 
 
c) Absolute returns109- 
Excessive volatility and poor investment performance experienced by quoted 
equity portfolios, many of which have index-tracking strategies or are 
benchmarked to an index, have led to a swing in favour of strategies that seek 
absolute returns110. Private equity managers do seek absolute returns and their 
traditional incentivisation structure, the “carried interest”, is highly geared 
towards achieving net cash returns to investors111. 
 
d) Exposure to smaller companies market112- 
The private equity industry has brought corporate governance to smaller 
companies and provides an attractive manner of gaining exposure to a growth 
sector that went out of favour with quoted market investors in the mid 990’s for 
reasons of liquidity113. 
 
e) Access to legitimate inside information114- 
A much greater depth of information on proposed company investments is 
available to private equity managers115. This helps the managers more accurately 
assess the viability of the company’s proposed business plan and to project the 
post-investment strategy to be pursued and expected future performance116. 
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f) Influence over management and flexibility of implementation117- 
Private equity managers generally seek active participation in a company’s 
strategic direction, from the development of a business plan to the selection of 
senior executives, introduction of potential customers, M&A strategy and the 
identification of eventual acquirers of the business118. This flexibility represents 
another feature whereby risk can be reduced in private equity investment119. 
 
g) Leveraging off balance sheet120- 
Buyout managers in particular are able to make efficient use of leverage121. They 
aim to organise each portfolio company’s funding in the most efficient way, 
making full use of different borrowing options from senior secured debt to 
mezzanine capital and high yield debt122. By organising the company’s funding 
requirements efficiently, the equity returns are potentially enhanced123. Thus the 
investor has the effective benefit of a leveraged portfolio with less downside 
risk124. 
 
 
2.9 Private Equity and Due Diligence 
 
Due diligence is the term used for a number of concepts involving either the 
performance of an investigation of a business or person; or the performance of an act 
with a certain standard of care125. It can be a legal obligation, but the term will more 
commonly apply to voluntary investigations126. Some common examples of due 
diligence in the various industries includes: The process through which a potential 
acquirer evaluates a target company or its assets for acquisition and also bounding127. 
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In business transactions, the due diligence process varies for different types of 
companies128. The relevant areas of concern may include intellectual property, real 
and personal property, insurance and liability coverage, debt instrument review, 
employee benefits and labour matters, immigration and international transactions129. 
 
Due diligence plays an important role in the area of private equity relating to manager 
selection and investing in a potential fund. The principal criteria for private equity 
fund selection usually relate to the credentials of management teams130. The variation 
in performance between upper and lower quartile managers in the private equity 
market is substantially more diverse than in listed equity and bond markets131. 
 
Investors should evaluate each manager’s credentials by investigating its track record 
and reputation closely132. Research has shown that a manager’s track record can be an 
indicator of future success as the percentage of new funds that become top quartile 
performers has historically been the highest among managers of previous top quartile 
funds133. 
 
A proposed fund’s investment strategy should be clear and very similar to that on 
which the manager’s track record is founded134. The track record should demonstrate 
a disciplined approach and the ability to adhere to the articulated strategy135. The 
amount of money being raised should be clearly justified by the magnitude of the 
perceived investment opportunity and the extent of the manager’s resources136. The 
investment strategy should be attractive in the context of the wider economic 
landscape, which will impact the market opportunity137. 
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Publicly available statistics showing upper quartile rates of investment performance 
are becoming more accurate as a benchmark for funds by sector and vintage year138. 
Prospective investors need to examine the internal rates of return on investments in 
conjunction with multiples of original costs realised139. Consistent upper quartile 
returns over an extended period of time and a good number of realised investments 
are preferred140. 
 
 Returns are often quoted on a “gross” or “net” basis141. The gross return represents 
the fund’s return on its investments and does not take into account the fees and 
expenses of the fund or the dilutive effect of holding uninvested cash142. The net 
return represents the investors return and is also referred to as the “cash on cash” 
return143. Returns on realised investments are often also distinguished from returns on 
unrealised investments144. Investors should look for a large proportion of realised 
investments in the portfolio145. In respect of unrealised investments, the investors 
would want to examine valuation policy146. An analysis of the dispersions of the 
returns on an investment by investment basis illustrates the volatility of returns and 
risk associated with the investment strategy147. For example, buyout returns ought to 
be less volatile than venture capital returns148.  
 
An assessment of the ability of a manager to reproduce previous quartile performance 
will focus on the individuals comprising the management team, their incentivisation 
and the past and future continuity within the team149. The most important aspect of 
each individual’s background should be solid experience as a private equity 
manager150. Additional attributes, such as relevant operational, sector or scientific 
experience, are helpful151. It is important that the core members of the management 
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team have already been working as a team for a significant period and departures 
from this core team have been minimal152. This will provide clearer attribution of the 
investment track record to these individuals and give some comfort as to the future 
continuity of the team153. It is normally very helpful to speak to business counterparts 
in respect of the individuals, as they may provide some insight into the dynamic of the 
team154.  
 
Further comfort with respect to the future can be derived from the incentivisation 
structure155. Broadly, all the key executives should receive a fair proportion of the 
carried interest and ideally it would be spared widely throughout the team156. This will 
give comfort as to the strength and depth of the team157. It will also evidence planning 
for the future succession of senior management responsibility within the management 
team158. Personal commitments to the fund by the management team that are 
meaningful in the context of their net worth are also good indicators of 
commitment159.  
 
Investors will generally look for a coordinated origination strategy and a disciplined 
procedure for evaluating investments160. This should include valuation of a business 
plan, the likely exit route and expected investment returns161. There needs to be 
proven discipline among the principals of the fund as to the application of decision-
making criteria162. This will include pricing discipline and it is an advantage for 
managers to demonstrate transactions declined on pricing grounds163. In venture 
capital, investors may look for evidence on preparedness to cut losses in under 
performing investments rather than following in on subsequent grounds164. In buyout 
funds, the ability to tap the debt markets efficiently is an advantage165.  
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With regard to monitoring, how the manager uses valuation metrics or milestones in 
the business plan will be of interest166. Having alternative exit strategies is considered 
to be a strong point in all private equity transactions and the way a manager plans for 
an exit is a key factor167.  
 
The greater the number of underlying investments means that the diversification of 
the risk will inevitably also be greater168. If the investments are very concentrated in 
number, or focused in one particular geography or field of operation, then the risk 
becomes more concentrated169. However, private equity managers tend to be heavily 
committed to investments and therefore the number of deals that a team can source, 
evaluate, operate and realise is strictly limited170. So there is also risk if a team 
spreads itself too thinly or operates in fields or geographies where it has limited prior 
experience171. 
 
Given the importance of building a diversified portfolio, an investor should ensure 
that the type of fund and its strategies fits into the broader private equity portfolio 
strategy without unnecessary duplication172. 
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CHAPTER 3: TAX CONSIDERATIONS 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
When a private equity fund is formed, the fund sponsor must address certain issues. 
One of those issues, pertinent to this chapter, is that of tax.173 
 
This chapter will have regard to Tax Considerations in Structuring a US-Based 
Private Equity Fund174 as well as the concern in South Africa in relation to private 
equity transactions and tax considerations. 
 
The aim of a private equity fund is to improve the performance of the respective 
businesses and sell at a profit after holding an investment for several years.175 The 
target investor group will include local and foreign institutions, individuals, 
governmental entities and perhaps other private equity funds.176 
 
 
3.2 Position in the United States 
 
Most US investors will share a common tax objective when investing in the fund. 
These include: 
The fund should not bear tax; 
Pass through of capital gains and losses, allowing individuals to 
enjoy favourable tax rates on capital gains; 
 The minimisation of “phantom” income (i.e. the allocation of 
profits to the investor that are included in the investor’s taxable 
income without receiving cash); 
No tax reporting in non-US jurisdictions or, if taxes are incurred, the 
ability to credit those taxes against US tax on the gain.177 
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In addition, there are certain specific requirements unique to certain classes of US 
investors, particularly pension plans, private foundations, charitable trusts and other 
tax-exempt investors.178 
 
On of the concerns transmits to Unrelated Business Taxable Income (UBTI).179 
Certain US investors who are generally exempt from tax in the United States are 
taxable in respect of UBTI.180 It will not include dividends, interest and capital gains 
from the fund’s investment activities, but will include all or a portion of the income 
that the fund earns from the investments that are in whole or part financed with 
indebtedness (called Unrelated Debt Financed Income).181 
 
The sponsor will generally be required under the fund’s limited partnership agreement 
to avoid or minimize UBTI, or may be required to give certain investors the right to 
opt out of UBTI generating investments.182 This then reduces the amount that is 
taxable.183 It could be seen as a loophole in the US tax structure relating to private 
equity. It also provides investors with a mechanism to reduce the taxable amount of 
their returns in relation to their investment.184  
 
Most non-US investors will share the following common tax objective when investing 
in the fund. These include: 
No US taxation of gains; 
By investing through the fund, the investor’s tax in the investor’s 
home jurisdiction is not worse than if the investor made an investment 
in the portfolio company directly; and 
Anonymity, i.e. no obligation to disclose the identity of the fund’s 
investors to taxing authorities.185 
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In addition there are certain specific requirements unique to certain classes of non-US 
investors.186 One of these classes includes Pension Funds. Unlike their US counterparts, 
there is no special exemption from US tax for non-US pension funds as a matter of US 
tax law.187 Treaties may, however, eliminate withholding tax on dividends and interest 
that otherwise may be applicable.188 
 
The basic US tax regime applicable to non-US investors in US-based private equity 
funds is that they are exempt from taxation on gains arising from portfolio investment 
activities, making the United States a tax haven of sorts for foreign private equity 
capital.189 United States tax law provides that a private equity fund that is investing or 
trading for its own account is not engaged in a trade or business in the United States, 
even if the fund is managed in the US, and is therefore not subject to tax on gains.190 
 
 
3.3 Position in South Africa 
 
According to South African Tax Law, non-resident investors are subject to South 
African tax in respect of any South African (SA) sourced income or income deemed to 
be sourced from SA.191 
 
Because of this, foreign investors into SA funds (such as hedge funds, private equity 
funds) face an enquiry into whether the profits from such investments are derived from 
a source or deemed source within the country.192 This is particularly relevant where the 
foreign investors have a direct exposure to the underlying assets, such as where the 
fund is a transparent entity such as a partnership.193 
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In determining the source of the income from investments into SA assets, it is generally 
necessary to determine the originating cause of such income.194 This examines factors 
such as the place where the capital is employed (SA), where the investment decisions 
are taken (typically SA), and where the capital raising takes place.195 
 
Based on these criteria, there is a real risk that the South African Revenue Services 
(SARS) could impose tax on foreign investors into SA funds particularly where the 
foreign investors are directly exposed to the underlying assets of the fund.196 
 
Many local hedge funds are set up as partnerships, with the general partners based in 
SA.197 Since the general partner has the authority to bind other partners and make 
partnership decisions on their behalf, this increases the likelihood of exposure to SA tax 
for the foreign investors.198 
 
An investment into a fund that is constituted as a partnership has two additional 
issues.199 This means that even if the foreign investors invest from jurisdictions which 
have double tax agreements with South Africa, the fact that there is a general partner in 
SA means that the foreign investors have a tax presence (permanent establishment) in 
SA.200 This, in theory, gives SA the right to tax the income of non-resident investors.201 
 
Even if the non-resident investor’s gains are capital in nature, SA imposes tax on non-
resident investors with a tax presence in SA.202 The general partner (in SA) may create 
such a presence for foreign investors.203 
 
Until South Africa’s tax provisions are amended to provide clarity on whether it is 
really the intention of SARS to impose tax on foreign investors investing in SA funds, 
foreign investors should take advice on their potential SA tax exposures.204 
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3.4 South African Tax for Investors: Types of taxes in South Africa 
 
South Africa has a well-developed and regulated taxation regime based on international 
best practice. The tax regime is set by the National treasury and managed by the South 
African Revenue Service (SARS). 
 
 
Income tax: 
This is the principal source of direct taxation revenue in South Africa. Individuals are 
taxed on a progressive basis up to a maximum rate of 42 percent on taxable income 
exceeding R215 000 per annum. A uniform rate of tax is applied to all individuals, 
irrespective of gender or marital status, and without child rebates. 
 
Tax on income on non-South African residents is source-based, meaning that all 
income arising from a source within (or deemed to be within) South Africa is taxed, 
irrespective of the residence of the recipient of the income. 
 
 
Value Added Tax (VAT): 
This is the principal source of indirect taxation revenue in South Africa. If a subsidiary 
or branch of a foreign-owned company sells goods or provides services, it must register 
as a vendor with SARS and charge and pay over VAT. 
 
The standard rate of VAT is 14 percent. Exports, certain foodstuffs and other supplies 
are zero rated, and certain supplies are exempt (mainly certain financial services, 
residential accommodation and public transport). 
 
 
Capital gains Tax: 
This type of tax is levied on non-residents to the extent that they dispose of immovable 
property situated in South Africa, or have a permanent establishment in SA and dispose 
of an asset of that establishment. 
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These taxes are the main taxes that are applicable in South Africa. Other taxes do apply 
such as Pay As You Earn (PAYE), this tax is applicable to employees of a company. 
Regional service council levies on gross revenue and salaries. A skills development 
levy at the rate of 0.5 percent of payroll is payable. Transfer duty is payable on land and 
buildings. Stamp duty is payable on transfer and issue of shares, leases and mortgage 
bonds. Customs and excise taxes are also payable. Compulsory workmen’s 
compensation, assurance and unemployment insurance fund premiums are payable, 
although these are relatively insignificant. 
 
 
3.5 Tax concerns relating to Private Equity Buyouts in South Africa 
 
UNI affiliates in South Africa are concerned at the wave of private equity buyout 
activity in the country.205 Globally private equity funds have $500bn to spend and 
South Africa is in their sights.206 
 
The union’s main concern is that of employment as there is uncertainty as to what 
exactly will happen to employees after a company is taken private.207 There are no 
commitments on jobs or future investments and they have no idea as to who the 
ultimate owners will be.208 
 
There have been indications that the Ministry of Finance is concerned about private 
equity activity in South Africa.209 
 
Business Day Newspaper reported (21/02/07) that the government has voiced 
displeasure of how private equity deals rob the country of vast amounts of tax 
revenue.210 This concern arose because as in the Edgars case, a large portion of cash 
flow will be used to repay loans taken out by private equity buyers- loans that are 
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mostly sourced from overseas banks.211 According to South African tax law, the loans 
are not income sourced or deemed to be sourced from within the Republic and are 
therefore not subject to South African tax.212 
 
There has however been speculation that a non-resident tax on interest payable to 
foreign loans made to non governmental organisations is in the pipeline to curb the 
outflow of cash flow that would otherwise not be subject to tax in South Africa.213 
 
 
3.6 The Big Tax Debate: Raise or Reduce 
 
There is an ongoing debate in the US surrounding tax and private equity firms. Private 
equity firms are subject to lower tax rates than other companies and individuals. 
 
This is seen as an advantage for private equity firm fund managers who are taxed on 
profits at a rate of 15 percent. 
 
Private equity firms raise funds from investors, including institutions, pension plans and 
wealth individuals, and use the money, combined with loans, to acquire companies in 
the hope of selling them at a profit.214 
 
Fund managers usually get a cut of those profits- often 20 percent- and that cut, known 
as carried interest, is taxed as capital gain, at a rate of 15 percent.215 In recent months 
lawmakers and labour groups in the US have been increasingly questioning whether 
these profits should be taxed at the 35 percent rate. 
 
Another argument that is in favour of not raising tax rates states that efforts in congress 
to more than double taxes on managers of private equity firms would generate little or 
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no extra revenue to help pay for middle class tax cuts that many US lawmakers are 
seeking.216  
 
According to an International Herald Tribune article: “Tax change for private equity 
firms may yield little, study finds”, buyout and venture capital firms would restructure 
their affairs in order to sidestep the new tax laws. This study was conducted by Michael 
Knoll, a law professor at the University of Pennsylvania. 
 
It was stated in the study that at most, lawmakers may generate $3.2 Billion a year in 
added revenue by raising taxes on the share of profit (carried interest), that executives 
receive as compensation for managing funds. 
 
The study signaled an uphill battle for lawmakers trying to raise the money needed to 
pay for eliminating the alternative minimum tax for about 23 million mostly middle-
income households. 
 
According to the article, Drew Maloney, a principal at Ogilvy Government Relations 
stated that “What seems to some folks as an easy fix is not quite as simple and clean 
and will not generate the kind of revenue they expect”.  
 
The rationale behind the plan to increase tax on fund managers with legislation is to 
permanently eradicate the alternative minimum tax (AMT) for most families that would 
benefit 90 million households in the US.217 
 
The legislation would therefore tax carried interest as wages, which is currently taxed at 
a rate as high as 37.9 percent. That income, typically 20 percent of a fund’s profit, is 
now taxed at 15 percent, the capital gains rate. 
 
 
In the above-cited New York Times article “Bill is offered to increase tax on private 
equity”, it is stated that in the bill that was introduced to increase tax on private equity, 
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that the US Congress must ensure that the tax code is fair and also that the bill was 
introduced to address equitable tax treatment and was not an attempt to penalize 
success. 
 
Matthew Rhodes-Kropf, a professor of finance at the Columbia School of Business, 
contended that the tax was a bad economic idea. He stated that “private equity is a very 
important part of our economy” and that raising taxes in respect of private equity firms 
will discourage private equity activity.218 
 
According to the article, it states that the most recent legislation seeks to compromise 
on this issue, allowing managers to receive capital gains treatment on any of their own 
money they invest in their funds but requiring that they pay ordinary tax rates for 
managing money for pension funds, endowments and for the wealthy. 
 
A similar debate has been playing out in Britain. The Financial Times, in the article 
“Private equity taxation to rise?” (17/08/2007) reported that Alistair Darling, the new 
UK Chancellor of the Exchequer, is considering an increase from 10 percent to 20 
percent in the base rate of capital gains tax for investments classed as business assets- 
such as holdings in unlisted companies or shares owned by employees. 
The US viewpoint is also shared that it is a populist desire to make the rich pay but 
increasing tax on private equity is, in economic terms, very dangerous. These firms are 
the most mobile, the most able to move if they come under attack. 
 
In an industry where firms are so mobile and face such low barriers to shifting capital 
where its treatment will be more favourable this analogy from George Gilder’s Wealth 
and Poverty, seems particularly apt:  
 
“In an increasing competitive global economy, a government 
can no more raise its revenues simply by raising its taxes than 
a company can raise its income simply by raising its prices.  
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Like a company, a government must constantly lower its 
prices and improve its services to expand its market (its tax 
base)” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         
 
CHAPTER 4: FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 
 
4.1 Introduction: 
 
The last decade has seen a dramatic increase in foreign direct investment (FDI) 
defined as the ownership and control of a business or part of a business in another 
country219. FDI is usually distinguished from portfolio investment, where a foreign 
actor purchases securities in a domestic company solely to earn a financial return, 
without the intent to own, control or manage the domestic firm.  
 
FDI generally takes one of three forms: an infusion of new equity capital such as a 
new plant or joint venture; reinvested corporate earnings and net borrowing through 
the parent company or affiliates220. 
 
While many developing countries have come in recent years to take a more positive 
view of foreign investment and have moved to dismantle many explicit barriers and 
disincentives, ownership by foreign investors has become of increasing concern in 
certain industrialized countries, particularly the United States that traditionally 
complained about illiberal attitudes elsewhere towards foreign investment221. 
 
The issue of foreign investment is closely linked to the role of multinational 
corporations in the global political economy. Some see such corporations as powers 
unto themselves, capable of buying or intimidating governments, or at least with the 
capacity to spread production and other functions around the globe so as to exploit 
regulatory differences between states- taking advantage of one country’s cheap 
labour, another’s tax haven and yet another’s favourable rules on intellectual property 
and perhaps creating a race to the bottom222. 
 
It is also widely argued that a country’s economic performance over time is 
determined to a great measure by its political, institutional and legal regulatory 
environment. These institutions and policies of government form the Governance, 
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whereas infrastructure largely determines the inflow of FDI. The flow of FDI is 
largely determined by a good and favourable investment climate which is a precursor 
to economic growth and Sustainable Human Development (SHD). In addition to this, 
economic governance, infrastructure and other structural infrastructure have a very 
important role to play in the attraction of FDI. Developing countries in Africa have a 
primordial role to play in the regulation of FDI, which role among others must include 
the enhancement, enforcement and judicious maintenance of the rule of law, ensuring 
accountability and transparency in both private and public management. This 
regulatory role also extends to the multinational corporations on national institutions. 
It is a cardinal principle of investment that an investor needs to be secure with his 
investment anywhere.  
 
This chapter, then, shall be exploring what exactly FDI is; the Factors attracting FDI; 
the regulation of FDI; the Interrelation between FDI and Private Equity; FDI in Africa 
and South Africa will be examined; and FDI and the WTO will also be discussed. 
 
     
4.2 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI): Defined 
 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is defined as international interest in which a 
resident in one country obtains a long lasting interest in an enterprise resident in 
another.223 It is a situation where a foreign country creates a subsidiary to provide 
goods and services.224 Thus, a firm undertakes FDI in a foreign market if it possessed 
with an ownership advantage over the local competitors.225 The ownership of the 
foreign investment usually remains in the investing (home) country. FDI represents 
the primary means of transfer of private capital (i.e. physical or financial), technology, 
personnel and access to brand names and marketing advantage.226 
 
 FDI has the potential to generate employment, raise productivity, transfer skills and 
technology, enhance exports and contribute to the long term economic development 
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of the world’s developing countries. More than ever, countries at all levels of 
development seek to leverage FDI for development227     
 
FDI is not only a transfer of ownership from domestic to foreign residents but also a 
mechanism that makes it possible for foreign investors to exercise management and 
control over host country firms- i.e. it is a corporate governance mechanism.228 
Both economic theory and empirical evidence suggests that FDI has a beneficial 
impact on developing host countries.229 It is thought to be more useful to a country 
than investments in the equity of its companies because equity investments are 
potentially “hot money” which can leave at the first sign of trouble, whereas FDI is 
durable and generally useful whether things go well or badly.230  
 
Economists tend to favour the free flow of capital across national borders because it 
allows capital to seek out the highest rate of return.231 Unrestricted capital flows may 
also offer several other advantages: International flows of capital reduce the risk faced 
by owners of capital by allowing them to diversify their lending and investment.232 
The global integration of capital markets can contribute to the spread of best practices 
in corporate governance.233 The global mobility of capital limits the ability of 
governments to pursue bad policy.234 
 
 
4.3 Factors Attracting Foreign Direct Investment: 
 
Many investors regard political and economic stability, availability of natural 
resources and a large and growing market as important factors to attract FDI.235 In a 
global environment the following determinants are preferred: 
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A favourable environment with low and stable rates and effective competition 
policies;236 low transaction and business costs for labour and trade regulations, entry 
and exit rules, location and environment regulation;237subcontract services to local 
firms;238 support quality assurance and technical extension to Small to Medium 
Enterprises (SME’s);239 human capital with diverse modern skills;240low cost 
infrastructure such as an effective communications system and transportation links;241 
Mergers and Acquisitions242and open policies in export activities-i.e. free trade and 
free foreign exchange regimes to maximise economies of scale.243 
 
 
4.4 The Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment: 
 
FDI is regulated through various agreements on an international, national and regional 
level. Nationally and regionally, FDI is regulated through Bilateral Investment 
Treaties (BIT’s). 
 
A BIT is an agreement establishing the terms and conditions for private investment by 
nationals and companies of one state in the state of the other.244 BIT’s are established 
through trade pacts. A trade pact is a wide ranging tax, tariff and trade pact that often 
includes investment guarantees.245  
 
Most BIT’s grant investments made by an investor of one Contracting State in the 
territory of the other a number of guarantees, which typically include fair and 
equitable treatment, protection from expropriation, free transfer of means and full 
protection and security.246 
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The distinctive feature of many BIT’s is that they allow for an alternative dispute 
resolution mechanism, whereby an investor whose rights under the BIT have been 
violated could have recourse to international arbitration, often under the auspices of 
ICSID (International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes), rather that 
suing the host State in its own courts.247 
 
On November 25 1959, the first BIT was signed between Germany and Pakistan. In 
the years after, most BIT’s were signed between developed and newly independent 
developing countries, especially those in Africa. Typically the BIT’s were initiated by 
the developed capital exporting country, with the usual objective being to secure 
higher standards of legal protection and guarantees for the investments of its firms 
than those offered under the national laws of the capital importing developing 
country. African countries signed more BIT’s than any other region in the world in 
the 1960’s. According to UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development), the current trend is that there is an increase in the number of BIT’s 
being signed between developing countries. 
 
Over the years, the primary features of BIT’s have remained largely the same, 
especially regarding format, objectives and main provisions. There are typically four 
or five sets of major provisions. The first set usually outlines the scope and definition 
of foreign investment. The second set deals with the rules and conditions for 
admission of investments and focuses on national and most favoured nation treatment 
and on fair and equitable treatment. In the third set, the parties usually agree on some 
kind of guarantee and compensation scheme regarding the loss of investment due to 
expropriation, war or civil disturbances, guarantees of free transfer of funds and 
repatriation of capital and profits, subrogation on insurance claims and “State-to 
State” and “Investor-to State” dispute-settlement provisions. Other provisions may 
deal with the transparency and enforcement of national laws, performance 
requirements, entry and movement of foreign personnel and general exceptions. 
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4.5 The Interrelation between Private Equity and Foreign Direct Investment 
 
Private equity can be construed as a form of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). They 
are both a form of investment with a view of providing investors with a worthwhile 
return on the investment that has been made. Both private equity and FDI is subject to 
foreign ownership. The investments are usually made in enterprises that are resident 
in countries other than where the investors are resident. 
 
FDI as an investment in the economy of a country aids in economic growth. This 
then, in turn, leads to a number of advantages for a country and its citizens. Among 
the many advantages, these seem to be the most important: The advancement of 
infrastructure which is of utmost importance especially in a developing country and 
economy. With the injection of FDI into the economy of a developing country, aimed 
at improving the infrastructure, other foreign investors could also be attracted to that 
particular country and invest in other sectors. 
 
More employment opportunities can also be created through investments that support 
projects which aid in providing skills to people in less developed areas of a country 
(i.e. rural areas). The skills acquired can then be used to empower communities that 
would otherwise not have had the opportunities but for the investments. 
 
The above elements then create an increased standard of living. This is the most 
important factor that emanates from the investment made. An increased standard of 
living, in my opinion, is the ultimate goal of FDI’s. The nature of FDI is long term 
investments that are advantageous to a country even in dismal and trying times, 
especially in the economic facet of a country. A higher standard of living not only 
aids those who initially benefit from it but it also ensures that the standard of living of 
future citizens will be better than those who were primarily the beneficiaries of FDI. 
 
An increased standard of living in turn leads to the eventual eradication of poverty. 
This factor is one of the greatest inhibitors of growth in many developing and least-
developed nations. Poverty robs a nation of valuable advancement opportunities. It 
almost single-handedly ensures the stagnation of economic and infrastructural growth. 
 
 
 
 
         
 
With projects in place that are supported by FDI, one can work towards a future 
where poverty will only be known as a ghost of the past. 
 
Hand in hand with poverty are two factors that can cripple a country if it spirals out of 
control. These factors are disease and corruption. Disease in most cases is mainly 
prevalent in rural areas and in under-developed and overcrowded urban areas. These 
areas are also usually not well supported by governments as corruption filters through. 
The main diseases in developing and least-developed nations are Tuberculosis and 
HIV-AIDS, which are interrelated diseases. HIV-AIDS is the cause of most adult 
deaths on the African continent. This then leads to children becoming orphans and 
also to child-headed households. This demon deprives the children of valuable 
education opportunities which every child should be afforded and entitled to. 
 
With FDI backed projects aimed at the health and education sectors in developing and 
least developed nations, both the above-mentioned problems could be substantially 
alleviated. 
 
Corruption in governments of developing and least-developed countries plays a major 
contributing role as an inhibitor of economic freedom and growth. The situation in 
Nigeria is an exemplary example of how corruption hampers growth opportunities. 
The oil rich nation is home to one of the most poverty stricken people on the 
continent. FDI is injected into the country but somehow seems to get lost along the 
way as it falls into the hands of greed and power hungry politicians who’s only 
concern is self-advancement and getting ahead despite the consequences.  
 
Anti corruption measures have been put in place but it is ultimately the government 
that has to ensure the implementation of those measures which renders the situation 
even more difficult to overcome. 
 
 
If FDI’s are properly implemented by government and other sectors of a government, 
the goals and objectives of it can be achieved. Better governmental policies and 
politicians ensure that funds, aimed at improving the lives of citizens and the 
economy, are utilised effectively. Corruption free governments lead to stronger 
 
 
 
 
         
 
economies and secure a better future for the people of a nation. A strong government 
and economy encourages a country to be able to advance and take part in a stronger 
and more efficient global economy. 
 
Private equity and FDI can then be equated as the aims and objectives are similar in 
nature, with FDI being the more secure option for governments because of the long 
term nature of Foreign Direct Investment. 
 
 
4.6 FDI in Africa: 
 
Globally, the mention of Africa evolves images of civil unrest, war, poverty disease 
and mounting social problems among the other ever growing problems. For this 
reason African countries are faced with a great challenge to attract FDI248.  
 
Most of the FDI’s are found in developed countries, and the emphasis is on 
manufacturing and finances249. The question then is what will happen to less 
developed countries where the prominence was primarily on agriculture, extractive 
industries and public utilities250. 
 
A number of African countries have been making serious efforts to liberalise external 
trade to attract FDI251. In 1999, there was an estimated stock of $865 billion worth of 
foreign direct investment in the world252. The developed countries attracted nearly 
three quarters of the total inflow of FDI253. Africa has during the last three decades 
managed to attract more FDI from 8 dollars to almost 15 dollars per $1000 of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) during 1970-1997254. 
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4.7 The Challenges in Africa: 
 
The following shortcomings are still found in African countries: 
 
Many countries are still making it difficult to obtain expatriate permits quickly and 
efficiently255. The nature of the granting of investment incentives is variable256. 
 For example, South Africa grants several industry specific incentives and 
activities257. Ghana has abolished tax holidays in favour of low general tax rates258. 
There are considerable variation in FDI entry procedures and requirements across 
African countries259. Export Processing Zones (EPZ’s) are created as incentives but 
their effectiveness is eroded by restrictive provisions and bureaucratic procedures260. 
Africa experiences red tape as a main obstacle for investment261. Administrative 
barriers should be liberalised262. Most countries became operational263. Africa has a 
poor reputation among foreign direct investors as a continent marred by starvation, 
war and high risk264. Investors should have a different perception and see Africa as a 
good place for FDI’s265. The type of FDI should be identified266. Africa needs 
resource-driven, market-driven and efficiency-driven FDI’s267. FDI statistics should 
cover the African continent as a whole268. 
 
 
4.8 FDI and South Africa: The Economic Strength of South Africa 
 
The success of the first democratic election in 1994 put the economy on the path of 
growth and development and at the same time created a conducive environment for 
both domestic, regional as well as for foreign investment that have continued to robust 
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the economy despite World economic slumps and booms that have weakened some 
developing economies around the world.269 Despite this, South Africa remains one of 
the world’s favourite emerging markets, offering investors highly sophisticated 
financial infrastructures and exceptional investment opportunities and incentives.270 
Coupled to the positive indicators, the government has put in place an investment 
friendly range of business incentives against a background of robust standardized 
economic policies regulated by very efficient rules and structures.271 To this could be 
added its open business climate with transparent rules and regulations, high standards 
of corporate governance, one of the most liberal constitutions in the world and a strict 
observance of the rule of law.272 
 
Following the state of things, South Africa is the leading economy in Sub-Saharan 
Africa and often considered as the gateway to Africa.273 This fact is supported by the 
presence of many multinationals based in the country and also by the exporting of 
local goods and services to the rest of Africa.274 Even though still considered as a 
developing economy, its infrastructure and structures far surpass those of other 
developing economies on the same classification on the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO). An appraisal of the South African economy reveals its growth and macro 
stability in the face of a fluctuating world economy.275 
 
The South African Trade and Industry Department in implementing government 
economic policies offer a number of incentives to investors, both foreign and 
domestic.276 The Department of Trade and Industry (the DTI)’s primary role is to 
facilitate access to sustainable economic growth with the main objective of promoting 
the development of small, medium and micro enterprises (SMME’s), increasing Black 
Economic Empowerment (BEE), reducing inequality and poverty reduction, 
developing the South African Development Community (SADC) region and 
strengthening the international competitiveness of South African business internally 
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as well as externally in collaboration with the Department of Foreign Affairs 
(DFA).277 In the same framework, these incentives are geared towards increased 
market access to foreign investment and to usher in an air of fair, efficient and 
competitiveness in the market place.278  
 
 
4.9 Foreign Direct Investment and the World Trade Organisation: 
 
The WTO is currently working towards an agreement that would internationally 
regulate FDI. This agreement is known as the Multilateral Agreement on Investment 
(MAI).279 
 
Much has been written about the MAI that has been negotiated by OECD 
(Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development) Countries.280 Perhaps 
even more has been said by the critics of those who would like to see an agreement of 
this kind extended among other countries.281 There has indeed been a great deal of 
“toing” and “froing” about the desirability of MAI and even misunderstandings about 
its merits. The principal question is whether there is any need for an MAI.282 There 
are arguments in favour and against. On balance, the positive aspects of a multilateral 
agreement should outweigh the negative ones.283  
 
The arguments for and against the need for the MAI clearly demonstrate that there has 
not been enough agreement about the need for an MAI, even though the pendulum is 
swinging towards the ‘multilateralists’.284 While the need for FDI is generally 
recognised, the push for an international agreement has rather been lukewarm in some 
countries.285 This lack of enthusiasm or even outright hostility could be a serious 
problem for the international trading system and for capital markets. First, the 
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question of MAI divides the WTO members into those who support the idea of an 
agreement and those who are against it.286 In other words this is a divisive issue which 
could also hamper progress in other areas of WTO jurisdiction. Second, the division 
has gone along the lines of important country groupings-developed versus least 
developed countries (LDC’s).287 This, too, is a serious business because of the interest 
of developing countries having LDC’s integrated into the multilateral trading 
system.288 Third, FDI has been growing dramatically over the last decade or so, 
resulting in a rapid pace of globalisation and a significant contribution of foreign 
capital to investment in many countries of the world.289 Unfortunately the growth of 
FDI has been uneven, with some LDC’s benefiting more than others, leading many 
people in academia and policy circles to fear that the latter countries, or at least some 
of them, will be marginalised.290 Fourth, there does not seem to be an agreement on 
the need for an MAI among international public institutions that give advice on trade 
and investment policies to countries.291 
 
The crucial question of whether an MAI is desirable, therefore, still lingers over the 
heads of trade ministers and other politicians.292 But even if one believes that there is 
an unambiguous need for an MAI, the question remains what kind of agreement 
should be proposed. Too much regulation can be costly, while too little regulation 
may be imprudent.293  
 
The principal question is whether there is indeed a need for an MAI.294   
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE STRUCTURE OF A PRIVATE EQUITY DEAL 
 
5.1 The Legal Structure of Private Equity Funds295 
 
The providers of the venture capital needed in order to structure a private equity fund 
include: Business Angels (Private persons), Investment companies, Corporate Venture 
companies, Private equity funds, Funds-of-Funds and Government-controlled 
entities296. 
 
Private Equity Funds are the preferred vehicle for pooled investments as they are tax 
transparent, flexible capital rules/procedures as well as flexible organisational 
rules/procedures apply to them297. 
 
In the regulation of limited partnerships, there must be two kinds of partners: 
a) Limited partners with limited liability (the investors in the limited partnership) 
b) General partners with unlimited liability (but it can also be a company with 
limited liability)298. 
 
The general partners shall have managerial or financial powers. Responsibility for day 
to day operation of the limited partnership can be delegated to a management 
company (controlled by the management team who also controls the general 
partner)299. Either the partnership or the general partner can make such delegation300. 
There are also additional regulation regarding registration and annual reports can also 
be undertaken by the appointed management company301. 
 
In the organisation, the corporate bodies required include the limited partnership (the 
“Fund”), the general partner (the “GP”) and the investment manager (the “IM”)302.  
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Optional corporate bodies that can be used within the organisation include an 
Advisory Board, and Investment Committee or an Investor Council (or board)303. The 
Capital needed is derived from commitments from investors, draw downs (also 
referred to as “Capital Calls”) and reinvestment of proceeds304. 
 
Timing issues relating to Private Equity Funds include the lifetime which is about ten 
to twelve years with a possible extension of one to five years305. The closings which 
are divided into two: one in connection with the establishment and another up to one 
year thereafter306. The investment period, this is four to six years from the first 
closing307. Lastly, the Cut-off date which is the last date at which investors can be 
required to make payments to the fund308. 
 
The general partner or the investment manager can be appointed by a sponsor or 
management309. They will then be authorised to do anything necessary to operate the 
partnership. There are however various restrictions and limitations regarding the 
behaviour of the GP/IM which include: Investments outside of the defined investment 
universe, size of the investment in any one company, use of debt by the fund, co-
investment by third parties (including other funds controlled by management) and 
also the establishment of other funds controlled by management310. 
 
The various fees and expenses include the establishment cost (which is 1-2 percent of 
the total commitment payable once), the management fee (which is 1.5-2.5 percent 
payable annually) and the transaction costs (which is split between the fund, IM and 
the portfolio companies)311. 
 
There are also various conflicts of interest that should be regulated. These include, 
among others, the establishment of other funds controlled by the management, co-
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investment by other funds controlled by management and also co-investment by 
investors in the Fund312. 
 
Figure 1.Structure of a typical Private Equity Fund: 
 
 
 
 
5.2 Private Equity Deal Structures313 
 
Private equity deal structures are formulated in time sheets. These are preliminary 
documents designed to facilitate and provide a framework for negotiations between 
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investors and entrepreneurs. A term sheet generally focuses on an enterprise’s 
valuation and the conditions under which investors agree to provide financing.  
The term sheet eventually forms the basis of several formal agreements including the 
stock purchase agreement which is a legal document that details who is buying what 
from whom, at what price and when. 
 
The process of arranging venture financing is challenging. Negotiating deals with 
terms that are satisfactory to both sides and ensuring that stakeholders’ interests are 
properly aligned is crucial. This process begins with a term sheet. 
 
The paragraphs below describe the key financial items in most term sheets. It also 
contains additional control provisions. 
 
a) Valuation 
Traditionally, companies in the industry assign value to enterprises as the result of a 
financing event. This approach is based on a per-share value and the valuation is on a 
fully diluted basis. 
 
b) Step-ups 
This describes the increase in share price form one financing round to the next. They 
also describe the increase in the value of the company since the last round of 
financing. Step-ups help motivate all the shareholders to remain engaged in the 
enterprise’s effort to build value.  
 
c) Securities 
Different investments have varying risk or reward characteristics which call for 
different types of securities to accommodate investor’s goals. The most common type 
used in venture capital transactions include: Common stock, Convertible preferred 
stock, Participating preferred stock, Redeemable preferred stock, Convertible debt, 
Mezzanine debt, Senior debt, Subordinated debt, Warrants, and Options. 
 
d) Anti-Dilution 
Dilution occurs when an investor’s proportionate ownership is reduced by the issue of 
new shares. Investors are primarily concerned with “down rounds” or financing 
 
 
 
 
         
 
rounds that value the company’s stock at a lower price per share than previous rounds. 
Down rounds may occur due to number of factors like economic conditions or 
company performance. Since investors cannot determine with certainty whether a 
company will undergo a down round, they negotiate certain rights or anti-dilution 
provisions referred to as “ratchets”, so that they may protect their investment. 
 
e) Pay-to play (Play or Pay) Provisions 
These are usually used with price-based anti-dilution measures. These provisions 
require an investor to participate (proportionally to their own share) in the down 
rounds in order to receive the benefits of their anti-dilution provisions. Failure to 
participate results in forced conversion from preferred to common or loss of anti-
dilution protection. This encourages the Venture Capitals to support the struggling 
portfolio companies through multiple rounds and increases the companies’ chances of 
survival. 
 
f) Other issues 
In addition to the key financial provisions described above, the term sheets usually 
include a number of other important items related to control and a mix of financial 
and non-financial terms is common. The non-financial terms described below include: 
 
Voting rights- Term sheets often address issues of control in order to allow investors 
in a company to add value and also exercise control if things go wrong. While 
investors may not want majority board control if things are going well, they may 
negotiate provisions that give them control if certain events occur. The golden rule 
often applies: he who has the gold makes the rules. 
 
Board Representation- Venture Capitalists may negotiate control of part of the Board 
of Directors, generally to influence decision making and to protect their investments 
rather than to run the company. Often, classes of stock holders are allowed to elect a 
percentage of the board members separately. If venture capitalists invest as a 
syndicate and board representation is not possible for all of the participating firms, 
then the board observer rights are an option. These rights allow investors to monitor 
their portfolio companies and to influence decisions by being present at board 
meetings, but they are not allowed to vote. 
 
 
 
 
         
 
 
Covenants- Most preferred stock issues and debt issues have associated covenants or 
things that the portfolio company promises to do (positive covenants) and not to do 
(negative covenants). They are negotiated on a case-by-case basis and often depend 
on other aspects of the deal. Failure to comply with the covenants can have serious 
consequences for the company such as automatic default on payments due. 
 
Vesting- This provision states that a manager or entrepreneur earns ownership of 
common stock or options only after a predetermined period of time or after the 
company achieves certain milestones. The most important effect of vesting is that it 
motivates employees to stay with the company and may prevent them from leaving 
prematurely to pursue other opportunities. 
 
Bridge Loans- Bridge financing can be used to prepare a company for sale or as a pre-
round financing. A bridge is, in essence, short term financing designed to be either 
repaid or converted into ownership securities. In the sale case, a bridge is useful when 
a company needs relatively small amounts of capital to achieve its final targets and 
achieve maximum value in the eyes of potential buyers. A bridge is also useful to 
pump cash into a company quickly while investors are found to complete a formal 
round of financing. Bridge investors often insist on warrants or equity kickers to 
compensate them for the higher risk of lending money to high growth ventures.  
 
Phased financing- A venture capital firm may agree to phased-financing or 
incremental financing in tranches. In this case, the entrepreneur and his or her team 
must reach certain milestones in order for the venture capitalist to agree to invest 
more capital in the startup. This has the additional benefit of allowing startup and the 
venture firms to trumpet the larger commitment amount, generating positive PR, 
while limiting the actual cash disbursements until the startup has proven itself.  
 
Staged financing may also cause misalignment of goals, however, since management 
may be motivated to cut corners to achieve milestones rather than focusing on the 
long term health of the company, its customer relationships and the value of its 
products and services. 
 
 
 
 
 
         
 
Much of the success of Private Equity deals and transactions are dependant on 
negotiations that recognise the needs of both investors and entrepreneurs alike. There 
has to be equity for both parties in order for the negotiation process to run smoothly. 
This will in turn lead to transactions that are not only beneficial for investors and 
entrepreneurs but also for the economy of the country where the transactions will be 
rooted.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         
 
CHAPTER SIX: THE EFFECT OF PRIVATE EQUITY IN THE CONTEXT 
OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN MINING SECTOR 
 
6.1 The Mining Sector of South Africa 
 
South Africa is particularly rich in mineral resources and is one of the leading raw 
material exporters in the world314. The main raw materials are gold, diamonds, 
platinum, chromium, vanadium, manganese, uranium, iron ore and coal315. These 
goods make up about sixty percent of the entire export316. With platinum, vanadium, 
manganese and chromium, South African is globally number one, as far as mineral 
resources as well as the actual mining and export volumes are concerned317. 
 
Gold mining still holds a special position318. Forty percent of the world’s gold 
reserves are still to be found in the Witwatersrand area319. The gold-bearing stone, 
however, has to be mined with considerable technical expenditure from great 
depths320. To produce one fine ounce of gold, on average about three tons of ore, five 
thousand litres of water and six hundred kilowatt hours of electricity are required321.  
 
Although well over a century old, South Africa’s mining industry is far from fully 
tapped322. The country is a treasure trove, with mineral deposits only matched by 
some countries of the former Soviet Union323. 
 
Only two strategic minerals- crude oil and bauxite- are not available in the country324. 
For the rest, the sector spans the full spectrum of the five major mineral categories, 
namely precious metals and minerals, energy minerals, non-ferrous metals and 
minerals, ferrous minerals and industrial minerals325. 
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Over the last few years, the price of gold has dropped continuously326. The main 
reason is the reduced demand for gold on the world market, because fewer currencies 
are being backed up by gold reserves327. Also competition from Australia and Russia 
puts pressure on the gold price because their gold mining is easier and cheaper328. 
 
The gold mines in South Africa suffered a heavy crisis temporarily, and in 1995 more 
than 100 000 workers were laid off (retrenched)329. So far, the industry has been saved 
from ruin by down sizing, establishing cooperatives and the weakening currency, 
although many mines has reached their limit of profitability and at times even work 
below it330. 
 
The South African economy has, in recent years, succeeded in reducing its 
dependency on the gold price331. In general, the economy is striving to shift away 
from its one-sided orientation as a raw materials exporter332. In future, the proportion 
of semi-finished and finished products in the entire export volume shall be increased 
by a capital-intensive modernisation of the industrial structures, which became 
outdated through the isolation of the apartheid era333. 
 
The South African mining industry is continually expanding and adapting to changing 
local and international world conditions, and remains a cornerstone of the economy 
making a significant contribution to economic activity, job creation and foreign 
exchange earnings334. 
 
Change strategies adopted by the mining industry since the end of the apartheid era in 
1994 have made it more competitive335. With new leadership in place, better structure 
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companies, and a more robust operating and financial base, South Africa will continue 
to be an important player in the global mining industry336. 
 
6.2 Private Equity and the South African Mining Industry 
 
Historically, private equity houses have taken little interest in the mining sector, with 
few transaction of note in an industry that has been perceived as inappropriate for 
financial purchasers337. With the ever-increasing buying power available to private 
equity and the rapidly changing metrics of the mining sector, perhaps it is time for the 
mining sector to be reconsidered338.  
 
The mining sector has not been a private equity target in the past due to various 
reasons339. Empirical evidence suggests it is a cyclical industry, Mining companies 
have been price takers and not price makers, cash flows has historically been 
unpredictable, there has been concerns over environmental and other reputational 
risks, it requires specialist knowledge to succeed, there were concerns over political 
and social risks in emerging markets and also a lack of possible exit options340. 
 
But, the mining industry clearly perceives things differently341. Transactions have 
seen a sharp pick-up since 2005, with global M&A deals spiking from US$16 billion 
in 2004 to US$54 billion and US$68 billion in 2005 and 2006 respectively342. 
 
The last metal price slump in the late 1990’s was significantly impacted by the 
exceptional de-stocking of inventories built up during the cold war by the former 
Soviet Union343. The impact of this was to greatly exaggerate the perception of 
mining being a cyclical industry344. The current higher metal prices are reflecting a 
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very fundamental supply/demand imbalance- the industry my now be out of sync with 
the macro economic cycle causing a step change in the metal pricing345. 
 
World demand for metals is closely related to global GDP, although rapidly 
expanding economies tend to have a higher intensity of use of some metals, 
particularly steels, than advanced countries346. Current levels of demand strength were 
not expected nor anticipated347. Whilst the western economies grow steadily, the 
growth of the Chinese and Indian economies continues to surprise, with no sign of 
abating348. 
 
Supply is constrained in ways that cannot be easily corrected and projected growth in 
demand already discounts substitution, recycling and thrifting349. There are various 
reasons for this. It can take up to ten years to develop a large mine, with current 
metals prices already taking into account existing projects coming on stream350. 
Outside of existing projects, there is a lack of new mineral discoveries as the most 
easy to find deposits are already known; exploration has been cut back as the long 
timescales for projects coming on stream make investment too risky; political risks 
has eliminated many prospective areas; high-tech and biotech are competing for the 
same risk capital and there has also been a lack of new exploration technology351. 
There is a major skills shortage relating to mining engineers and geologists352. There 
is a major materials shortage globally: tires and equipment often have three-year lead 
times353. 
 
Metal prices have increased substantially over the last three years, with the nickel and 
lead hitting record highs in early 2007 and tin enjoying a 22-year high354. Copper has 
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been heavily shorted since its high in May 2006, but is now holding at high price 
levels and the aluminium is experiencing a physical squeeze355.  
 
The knock on effect of this is that mining companies as become cash generative, with 
predictable and secure cash flows356. There are now major mining companies with 
low gearing and a diminishing pipeline of capital projects despite the acceleration of 
capital expenditure357. Many mining companies are now aggressively returning cash 
to shareholders358. Several of these organisations have unused credit capacity, are 
consciously “unhedged” and are aggressively consolidating to find growth 
opportunities through M&A activities359. 
 
Continued consolidation amongst the major players is leading to an element of greater 
pricing power by the producers, after decades during which a fragmented mining 
industry had little control over its product pricing360. Management is behaving more 
astutely in limiting capacity expansion and future overproduction. As a result, normal 
supply/demand economies are being established361. 
 
The importance of an exit strategy to private equity investors has been a barrier to 
investment in the mining sector362. The changing fundamentals in the industry mean 
that there are more exit opportunities, whilst the importance to the overall investment 
return is diminishing363. Given the changing fundamentals, a significant element of 
the required return on investment may be achieved prior to the exit364. 
 
Historically, public offerings have not been an option for the mining companies in 
emerging markets because of the perceived political risks in cross border 
transactions365. Recently, however, there have been many successful offerings from 
previously unappreciated geographies, such as the most recent offering on the London 
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Stock Exchange of Kazakhmys plc (Kazakhstan), Hothschilds plc (Peru) and GEM 
Diamonds plc (Africa)366. 
 
Short term cash returns are potentially higher tan acquisition prices would suggest, 
making the exit a less critical part of the overall return to private equity investors367. 
Coupled with the availability of IPO, the opportunity for private equity to make a 
target return on mining investments is greater than ever before368. 
 
 
6.3 Government Interference in the Mining Sector 
 
With the implementation of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development 
Act369 (MPRDA) in 2004, transformation of how business is conducted has become a 
key priority for the South African resources sector during the last two years370. This 
has presented the local mining sector with a number of corporate mindset challenges 
as many companies have had to transform their approach to business in order to 
comply with the requirements of the new legislation371. During the last two years, 
mining companies have had to alter the way they operate their business to meet the 
requirements of the new legislation which fundamentally changes the way in which 
mining companies are required to conduct their business372. This is evidenced in the 
fact that, subsequent to 1998, there has been relatively little legislation surviving from 
the previous regime373. As a result, the mindset of the mining sector has had to change 
to accommodate the emergence of a new legislative environment especially with 
regard to the ownership of minerals and black economic empowerment (BEE)374. The 
reality is that South African mining companies are operating in a new dispensation in 
which minerals belong to the State375. 
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Before the MPRDA was promulgated, South Africa was one of the few countries in 
the world that had private ownership of the minerals376. However, as all minerals 
belong to the State, mining companies have had to follow a process of rights 
conversion in order to continue mining or exploring activities377. This is time 
consuming, and, in some cases, costly for many companies but has contributed to the 
cementing of BEE in the industry as companies are compelled to have a BEE 
shareholding in order to obtain mining and prospecting rights378.  
 
Although many companies have concluded and embarked on BEE negotiations, a 
number of mining companies have yet to conclude a successful BEE transaction, 
which may be indicative of the reluctance to transform under the new legislation but 
could also be ascribed to the practical, technical and financial challenges facing these 
transactions379.  
 
However, if the mining sector and government wish too have an amicable relationship 
in the future, it is essential that mining companies speedily embrace and actively 
pursue all aspects of transformation380. 
 
The promulgation of the MPRDA, the act provides that one or the grounds on which 
the Minister of Minerals and Energy must refuse to grant a prospecting right381 is 
where the granting of the right “will result in the concentration of the minerals 
resources in question under control of the applicant”382. Since the commencement of 
the act, a number of applications for prospecting rights have been declined on this 
basis383. The reasoning, however, as to why it is considered that the application will 
result in the concentration of the mineral resources is generally not given384. 
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There are no guidelines either in the act, its regulations or elsewhere, defining 
concentration385. This is problematic as there is no framework provided by the 
Department of Minerals and Energy (DME) on which to base its decision386. It is 
suggested that the reason, that Minister must refuse to grant a prospecting right where 
the granting of the right will result in concentration, may be based on the objective of 
the MPRDA to “promote equitable access to the nation’s mineral and petroleum 
resources to all the people of South Africa387.  
 
The legislature could have taken the view that it would not be equitable should the 
rights of a particular mineral become too concentrated in the hands of any one 
holder388. It seems that the inclusion of the requirements that applicants be declined 
where they result in concentration of the mineral resource under the mineral applicant 
appears to be clearly motivated by matters of competition as opposed to equity and 
access to resources389. 
 
This is evident in the accompanying sections of the Act, which prohibit the minister 
from granting prospecting rights where the granting of the right will prevent fair 
competition or will result in an “exclusionary act”390.  
 
This term is commonly used in competition law and is defined in the MPRDA as “any 
act or practice which impedes or prevents any person from entering the mineral and 
mining industry or from entering any market connected with that industry, or from 
making progress within such industry or market”391. This places an onerous obligation 
on the Minister or the official delegated by the Minister to make the decision392. As 
the decision is administrative in nature, it is subject to both common law and 
constitutional safeguards393. The decisions should also be taken in a procedurally fair 
manner394.  
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The subsection cannot be used as a catch-all to prohibit any application which does 
not find favour with the department for whatever reason395. The implementation of 
competition law is most often the responsibility of the Competition Commission and 
the Competition Tribunal396. These bodies deals with issues such as market 
concentration on a daily basis and have developed considerable expertise397.  
 
It is required that the officials in the DME tasked with implementing the MPRDA 
incidentally develop the knowledge and expertise necessary to determine the impact 
of concentration of granting a prospective right but this is seen as a tall order398. The 
concept of concentration is quite commonly used in competition or anti trust law, 
particularly in the consideration of mergers399.  
 
To explain why high concentration is considered undesirable, the “structure-conduct-
performance” model of competition law is used400. Authors, Bishop and Walker, 
express this in “Economic of Competition Law”401. It states that the model holds that 
the more concentrated the market structure, the less competitively firms behave, 
which in turn leads to both higher prices and higher profits than under more 
competitive conditions402. Unlike the requirements in the MPRDA, the competition 
authorities are not limited to consider only ‘concentration’403. In determining the 
impact on competition of a merger, the authorities must consider any factor relevant 
to the market, for example, imports or ease of entry into the market404. 
 
If it appears that the merger will substantially prevent or lessen competition, the 
authority then considers whether there is some technological, efficiency or other pro-
competitive gain that may result from the merger which is greater than or may off-set 
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the lessening of competition405. There is no equivalent provision for this type of 
balancing of interests in the MPRDA406. The necessary preliminary step in calculating 
concentration in a market is to define the market itself407. 
 This usually includes a product market and a geographical market408. However, the 
MPRDA specifically require that the Minister consider the concentration of the 
mineral resources in question under the control of the applicant409. Therefore, as far as 
the product market is concerned, the MPRDA simply requires that this be determined 
with reference to the mineral to which the prospecting rights relate410. 
 
Mr. Donovan Smith of Bell Dewar and Hall Attorneys cites the example of 
determining concentration in an application for the prospecting of gold411. The 
appropriate geographic market to consider may be the global rather than the domestic 
market412. This is consistent with the decisions made by the Competition Tribunal 
relating to the sale of mineral rights relating to gold413. Accordingly, in order to 
determine whether or not the granting of a mineral right might result in market 
concentration, it would be necessary to determine the extent of the gold resources held 
by the applicant relevant to the total global resources available414.  
 
Bishop and Walker caution that “serious problems arise with using market shares to 
make inferences about competition when the definition of the market from which 
market shares are calculated is inappropriate”415. If the relevant geographic area is not 
properly determined then a prospecting right which might, in fact, decrease 
concentration might be incorrectly declined416.  
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The MPRDA and its regulations do not provide any guidelines regarding when 
concentration of the mineral resources becomes unacceptable417. Smith notes that, 
alternatively, in competition law, the common measure of market concentration is the 
Herfindahl-Hirschmann Index or HHI418. Other measures sometimes used are 
‘concentration ratios’, such as the CR4419. The US Department Justice has prescribed 
merger guidelines indicating the manner and levels at which the HHI ratio can be used 
to determine high market concentration as well as unacceptable increases in market 
concentration420. These guidelines are sometimes also referred to and applied by the 
South African competition authorities421. Smith is of the opinion that there is clearly a 
considerable amount of information which a decision maker requires at its disposal in 
order to make a decision regarding whether or not the granting of a prospective right 
will result in the concentration of that mineral resource422. For example, in order to 
determine the HHI, it is necessary to know the market share of at least the major 
competitors in that market423. He explains that the application for a prospecting right 
currently require that the applicant submit a table listing existing rights and permits 
held by the applicant and indicating the region, the location with regard to the land 
name and the existing right or permit number for each mineral424. An application does 
not require any other information regarding the extent of the concentration of the 
mineral resource or the possible impact of the application on that concentration425. 
Unless the information requested in the application form is supplemented with 
considerable data from within the Department of Minerals and Energy, for example, 
distribution of the mineral resource concerned, then it would simply not be possible 
for the Minister to properly make a determination426.  
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The final issue which should be considered is whether the requirement of the MPRDA 
is simply misplaced427. In essence; a prospecting right merely grants the holder a 
limited real right to search for the mineral which is subject to the prospecting right428. 
As the extent of the increase in mineral resources controlled by the applicant is 
unknown at the time of application there is insufficient information available to 
determine any impact on concentration429.  
 
Another consideration is that, in the event that the prospecting is successful, this 
increases the mineral resource available430. Therefore with the exception of 
prospecting by the largest existing controller of mineral resources or its near 
competitors, prospecting will inevitably decrease market concentration431. 
 
A decision regarding whether or not to decline a prospecting application where it 
results in the concentration of that mineral resource under the control of the applicant 
is not subjective432. The decision cannot be made on the basis of existing mineral 
rights held by the applicant alone and requires a consideration of economic and 
competition law principles as well as the determination of at least the relevant 
geographic boundary as well as the pre- and post-prospecting concentrations433.  
 
It is not only necessary for the DME to develop policies, guidelines and procedures to 
ensure the fair application of the ‘concentration’ requirement in the MPRDA, but the 
requirement itself may need to be assessed in order to determine whether or not, in 
fact, it achieves the objectives of the MPRDA434. 
 
The newly promulgated  minerals rights legislation resulted in the Italian investors in 
Marlin Holdings Limited and Marlin Corporation Limited and Red Graniti SA (Pty) 
Limited announcing that their request for compulsory international arbitration against 
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the South African government has been granted by the World Bank’s International 
Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) in Washington435.  
 
The request, under the ICSID additional facility, arises out of the May 2004 entry into 
force of the MPRDA, which placed previously privately owned mineral resources 
under state custodianship436. The request has been granted and it encompasses a 
comprehensive statement of the investor’s current and projected losses arising form 
this expropriation, and related damages, amounting to 266 million Euros437.  
 
Marlin is part of the Luxembourg incorporated, but privately held, Finstone Sarl 
group, while Red is a subsidiary of Red Graniti Spa of Italy438. The two groups’ 
combined operations employ some two thousand (2000) people439. The Finstone and 
Red groups are engaged internationally in the sourcing, quarrying, marketing and 
distribution of natural stone for the construction and monumental industries and are 
generally regarded as global leaders in their field440. 
 
Both groups rely to a large extent on volume productions from their operations in SA, 
principally in the Rustenburg area441. Finstone has also invested heavily in the 
processing of natural stone into finished and semi-finished products in line with the 
South African government’s policy of prioritizing beneficiation, particularly in 
respect of the countries rich mineral resources442. 
 
The request for the international arbitration was made under South Africa’s bilateral 
investment treaties (BIT’s) with Italy and the Belgo-Luxembourg economic union443. 
Under the BIT’s investors are entitled to “prompt adequate and effective” 
compensation for the expropriation of their South African investments, which must, in 
addition, be accorded “fair and equitable” treatment by South Africa444.  
                                                 
435 <www.miningweekly.co.za/article.php?a_id=102969> Assessed on 23/10/2007 
436 Ibid 
437 Ibid 
438 Ibid 
439 Ibid 
440 Ibid 
441 Ibid 
442 Ibid 
443 Ibid 
444 Ibid, also refer to Chapter4 – page 34. 
 
 
 
 
         
 
Moreover, the use and enjoyment of such investments under the BIT’s must not be 
subject to “discriminatory” measures445.  
 
In addition, under the proposed Mineral and Petroleum Royalty Bill, 2006, the 
investors will, from 2009, have to pay royalties on mineral rights which they 
previously owned446. The request points out that by extinguishing the ownership of 
the investors’ South African mineral rights without providing prompt, adequate and 
effective compensation, the entry into force of the MPRDA constitutes an unlawful 
expropriation of their investments447. Likewise, the South African Mining Charter’s 
forced divestiture of twenty-six percent of the investors’ investments to historically 
disadvantaged South Africans (HDSA’s),as a condition of the conversion of the 
investor’s old-order rights to new-order rights under the MPRDA, constitutes a 
violation of the BIT’s requirement that the investors receive “fair and equitable” 
treatment448.  
 
The investors did not invest in South Africa prior to 1993 and are not signatories to 
the Mining Charter449. Their South African subsidiaries are likewise not members of 
the SA Chamber of Mines, which signed the charter on behalf of the mining 
industry450. In the investors view, as set out in the request, the Mining Charter 
discriminates against foreign investors in favour of HDSA’s, and thus violates the 
BIT’s equitable treatment requirements451. The investors have attempted since 
December, 2004, to reach an amicable settlement of their claims with the South 
African governments452. Despite extensive correspondence and numerous meetings 
with the government over an eighteen month period, involving the diplomatic 
intervention of the Italian and Belgian governments, no settlement has been reached, 
leaving the investors with no option but to refer the matter to ICSID for international 
arbitration453. 
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6.4 Corruption and its Effect on the Economy 
 
Corruption is a general concept describing any organised, independent system in 
which part of the system is either not performing its duties as originally intended to, 
or performing them in an improper way to the detriment of the systems original 
purpose.454        
 
Corruption has become an issue of major political and economic significance in recent 
years and the necessity to take measures against it has become evident. 
 
It mainly affects the poorer nations such as Bolivia, Cameroon, Kenya, Nigeria, 
Bangladesh, etc.455 
 
The early 1990’s witnessed a proliferation of initiatives aimed at fighting corruption 
on national, regional and international levels.456 Fighting corruption has engendered a 
high degree of international co-operation, leading to an armoury of international 
instruments such as the OECD’s Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public 
Officials in International Business Transactions, and the Council of Europe’s 
Criminal Law Convention on Corruption.457 
 
In the long run, no country can afford the social, political or economic costs that 
corruption entails.458 
 
It erodes public confidence in political institutions and leads to contempt for the rule 
of law; it distorts the allocation of resources and undermines competition in the 
market place; it has a devastating effect on investment, growth and development. 
Furthermore, corruption exacts a high price on the poor by denying them access to 
vital basic services.459 
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6.5 What Corruption Entails: 
 
Corruption involves the improper or illegitimate pursuit of self interest which is 
improper and therefore corrupt.460 
 
It entails a transaction between a corruptor (the person who demands the ‘service’) 
and the corruptee (the person who supplies the ‘service’) that is in contravention of 
the law.461 
 
Corruption exists because there is a supply and demand for this service.462 Factors 
impinging on the supply of corruption would include the lack of income and 
alternative employment opportunities, the absence and/or poor state of detection and 
punishment mechanisms and the entrusting of significant discretionary powers to the 
corruptees. 
 
 
6.6 The OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions: 
 
The OECD Anti Bribery Convention is a convention of the OECD aimed at reducing 
corruption in developing countries by sanctioning bribery in international business 
transactions carried out by companies based in the convention member countries.463 
Its goal is to create a truly level playing field in today’s international business 
environment.464 
 
The convention came into effect in February 1999. Countries that have signed the 
convention are required to put in place legislation that criminalises the act of bribing a 
foreign public official.465 
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The OECD has no authority to implement the convention but instead monitors 
implementation by participating countries. Countries are responsible for 
implementing laws and regulations that conform to the convention and therefore 
provide for enforcement.466 
 
In Article 1 of the Agreement, bribery of foreign public officials is established as a 
criminal offence. 
 
Article 3 imposes sanctions for those guilty of bribery in Article 1. It states that the 
punishment shall be comparable to the punishment imposed for nationals of the 
member country for the offence of bribery. 
 
Article 5 states that the investigation and prosecution of the bribery of a foreign public 
official must be objective and not be influenced by any person. 
 
Article 7 incorporates the offence of money laundering into the offence of bribery of a 
foreign public official. 
 
Article 8 deals with the falsification of accounting records for the purpose of bribing 
foreign public officials or of hiding such bribery. It states that countries shall impose 
laws and regulations regarding those types of offences. 
 
Article 9 deals with Mutual Legal Assistance. It states that the parties shall provide 
other parties with legal assistance if so requested for the purpose of criminal 
investigations and proceedings. 
 
Article 10 makes provision for the extradition of those found guilty of the bribery of a 
foreign public official. 
 
Article 12 deals with monitoring and follow-up. It states that the parties carry out a 
programme of systematic follow-up to monitor and promote the full implementation 
of the Convention. 
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The remainder of the articles deal with miscellaneous provisions regarding 
administrative matters. 
 
The Convention serves to provide for the enforcement of punishment for the offence 
of bribing a foreign public official in an aim to combat corruption. 
 
 The only shortcoming of such conventions and agreements is that it cannot be 
enforced into the municipal laws of all countries as it only applies to those members 
that are signatories to the Convention. This shortcoming serves as a hurdle in the fight 
against corruption especially in developing countries where it is rife. 
 
 
6.7 The United Nations Convention against Corruption: 
 
This convention is closely related to the OECD convention. It, however, goes further 
into depth regarding corruption by providing more guidelines when dealing with the 
corruption if foreign public officials. 
 
It deals with the corruption of national officials of member countries and also 
provides more guidelines regarding money laundering, the public and private sector, 
mutual legal assistance as well as all of the provisions dealt with in the OECD 
convention. The Convention is more comprehensive and provides more enforcement 
mechanisms when dealing with corruption. 
 
Chapter III of the convention deals with Criminalisation and law enforcement. It goes 
further than the OECD convention in making provision for the criminalisation of not 
only bribery but also embezzlement, trading in influence, abuse of functions, illicit 
enrichment, bribery and embezzlement in the private sector, money laundering, 
concealment, obstruction of justice, participation and attempt. It also deals with the 
freezing, seizure and confiscation of proceeds and property derived from corruption. 
The protection of witnesses, experts and victims are made provision for. It also makes 
provision for the protection of reporting persons and also provides for the cooperation 
between members. 
 
 
 
 
         
 
As with the OECD convention, the United Nations Convention is only applicable to 
those countries that are signatories to the convention. This is once again seen as a 
shortcoming in the fight against corruption. 
 
The convention also deals with technical assistance provisions that aim at training the 
personnel responsible for the preventing and combating of corruption. 
 
The multitude of provisions is more effective in the punishment of corruption than the 
OECD convention which makes it more efficient in the fight against corruption. 
 
 
6.8 Corruption and Development: 
 
Developing societies and their people are not inherently more corrupt than developed 
ones. Yet, the argument is sometimes made that the lack of development opportunities 
automatically encourages corruption.467 
 
From this perspective, economic growth and development create social opportunities 
that are of potential benefit to people so that they tend to engage in honest activity to 
sustain themselves.468 A prospering economy can also afford to pay its civil servants 
well, reducing their motivation for corruption.469 
 
In contrast, the despair caused by inequality and pervasive poverty may encourage 
people to break the rules of honesty and decency. Major development related aspects 
are land, educational opportunities and access to capital.470 
 
Educational inequality often translates into broader income inequalities. People’s 
earning power is affected by their low levels of education, whereas higher education 
levels empower some groups to lobby government more effectively to prioritise their 
particular needs and requirements. 471 
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While none of these factors intrinsically lead to corruption; shortages of resources 
raise the stakes of competition for those resources that are available and slant the 
balance of power towards those with access.472 
 
Such intense competition may encourage people with access to resources to use 
corrupt means to hold on to those privileges, or serve as an incentive for the deprived 
to use corrupt means to improve their own plight.473 
 
Corruption cuts across international borders. Many cases of corruption reported in 
emerging economies involved corporations in the first world.474 Transnational 
corruption, for example, is particularly rife in the arms trade. A United State’s 
Commerce Department confidential annexe to a report on international bribery in July 
1998, noted that half of the recorded corruption complaints involved arms sales.475 
 
The ways of concealing foreign bribes are numerous. One often hears of companies 
effectively setting up bribery funds to buy favours from the governments of 
developing countries. For example, the Saudi Ministry of Defence officially bans 
commissions on arms contracts, but bribes have been channelled via obscure 
companies in Liechtenstein into Swiss accounts.476 
 
Sometimes middleman companies are designated as local subcontractors for ‘support’ 
and are lavishly overpaid for their services. For example, middlemen pocketed US 
$24 million on a $1 billion deal for Bell Canada to modernise Morocco’s 
telecommunications industry, despite the fact that the World Bank and the Canadian 
government were funding it on the condition that commissions were formally 
forbidden.477 
 
Corruption jeopardises development in several ways. It distorts public spending in 
three ways: from shaping the official priorities of government, by deflecting allocated 
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resources away from their original purpose and by undermining the tax base of the 
government.478 
 
In some of the world’s most notorious cases, the Philippines lost some 20% of 
internal revenue through corruption in the 1970’s; around 10% of Nigeria’s GDP and 
25% of Zaire’s went lost due to corruption.479  
 
In South Africa under apartheid, contracts in the Department of Development Aid; 
and Education and Training were frequently awarded in nepotistic fashion rather than 
on the basis of merit.480 
 
Because the poor have so little resources, their prospects of influencing the allocation 
of resources are limited by corrupt regimes.481 Poor people become primary victims. 
They are denied services either because their resources are moved elsewhere or 
because corrupt payoffs make services unaffordable.482 
 
In many cases, ill-structured projects, geared towards the wealth of corrupt officials 
and their co-conspirators, limit the number of jobs and opportunities that are created 
or cause these benefits of development to be allocated on the basis of favouritism.483 
 
When bribery results in public officials turning a blind eye to key risks, the poor are 
often the ones who suffer the most.484 Even in perfectly honest systems, public 
priorities are often shaped by the lobbying power of those with relatively more 
resources.485 However, where corruption occurs, distortions become more routine and 
the public good is generally regarded as being of secondary importance.486 
Corruption, therefore, is not a critical objective for all governments as many countries 
are not party to the conventions that deal with combating corruption. Many states 
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enact anti-corruption legislation but that does not serve to dissuade public officials 
from participating in corrupt activities. 
 
As long as there are people who make their self interest a priority, corruption will 
forever remain a hurdle that will cripple the economies of many nations especially 
having a profound impact on the economies of developing nations.   
 
 
 
 
         
 
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
 
7.1 Conclusion 
 
South Africa’s merger and acquisitions (M&A) environment is never dull, but in 
2006, the market was considerably spiced up by the announcement of several major 
private equity transactions, with the largest of them having a combined value of over 
R50 billion487.  
 
South Africa followed global trends by playing host to a significant increase in the 
value and volume of private equity deals488. According to research, global private 
equity reached an all-time high in activity levels, with 2354 deals being announced, 
and the total value increasing 172 percent to $751 billion compared to 2005489. The 
main surge in private equity activity was due to historically low interest rates in many 
of the main regions; healthy credit markets that padded the wallets of takeout firms; 
and wider support from lenders, making it easier for these firms to raise capital for 
deals via debt490. 
 
In the South African market, attention was focused sharply on private equity when a 
number of different consortiums made a bid for Shoprite, Consol, Alexander Forbes 
and Edcon491. The details of the Edcon offer were only made public after the end of 
the calendar year492. Putting the four deals together the combined price on offer from 
their private equity suitors is about $53 billion, or roughly 1 percent of the market 
capitalisation of the JSE Ltd’s main board493. 
 
Private equity firms have become popular solutions for company management teams 
entrusted with growing the businesses and providing sustainable value for the 
owners494. The opportunity arises for private equity firms when they see a gap 
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between the markets valuation and their estimation of the real worth of the 
business495. This ‘value gap’ is exploited by gearing the companies that are taken 
private and investing considerable time and energy in changing them to make them 
more efficient and profitable496.  
 
The key attributes of a private equity-worthy business include a respected 
management team, strong market share in a stable but not mature industry, robust 
cash flows and a well thought out strategy497. In a typical private equity transaction, 
the new shareholder will put debt into the balance sheet to make it more efficient and 
will ensure that management actions are aligned with the objectives of the new 
owners498. This is accomplished by bringing managers on board as co-owners499.  
 
South Africa’s domestic private equity firms may face some still competition from the 
biggest names in the business, with healthy speculation that a number of foreign are 
considerably establishing a presence in South Africa500. Many of the world’s largest 
private equity firms are increasingly looking at merging markets like South Africa for 
a number of reasons501. The value gap in their traditional markets has narrowed 
considerably, especially as management and shareholders become more aligned; 
developed markets are becoming ‘fished out’ with many of the best targets already 
identified; numerous opportunities exist in non-traditional markets and institutional 
funders of private equity are giving takeout firms broader mandates to invest in 
emerging economies502. 
 
Private equity, which was a bit of a Cinderella for many years, has come of age503. 
And it is a trend that is likely to continue as long as the value gap remains 
attractive504. 
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